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Abstract
We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individ-
uals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is
rooted in the principle “help anyone if helped by someone”. Within this general framework, which
applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation and
snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples.
By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show
that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which
the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating
individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured
by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to
cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at microscopic and macroscopic
level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an
interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A social dilemma arises in a situation where individual decisions are at odds with the
performance of the collective. As such it represents the epitome for studying the emergence
and stability of cooperative behavior in both natural and artificial systems [1–3].
Ever since the publication of Darwin’s epochal work [4], the appearing paradox of coop-
eration in social dilemmas has been at the focus of the research community. The insight
that all major transitions in biological evolution, from simple to complex structures, are
characterized by some degree of cooperation and sacrifice [5], has subsequently led to major
advances in the field. However, despite decades of investigation the cooperation paradigm is
still regarded as one of the most challenging issues currently faced by scientists [6].
A particular setting whose study is of great value to the complex systems community are
situations where an individual has repeated encounters within not necessarily the same group
or interaction structures. In this context, the concepts of direct reciprocity (“help someone
who has helped you before”) [7] and indirect reciprocity (“help someone who is helpful”) [8]
have been able to provide solutions for the emergence of cooperation in essentially disparate
types of social dilemmas. Although initially structured for encounters resembling a pris-
oner’s dilemma [9], both mechanisms have been extended to account for a disperse class of
interaction structures that are ubiquitous in natural systems (see Refs. [10–16]).
While being of significant theoretical value, the extent to which direct and indirect reci-
procity are able to explain cooperation in real-life systems has recently been put into ques-
tion [17, 18]. The reason for this is that the application of the rules is costly (in terms of
memory and processing requirements), in the sense that they demand high cognitive abilities
such as recognition of the group with which an individual is engaged in reciprocal mecha-
nisms or knowledge about the interaction outcomes. This, for example, limits the emergence
of cooperation in systems where there is randomness in the interactions and the individuals
do not posses the cognitive prowess to acknowledge with whom they play [18].
To tackle this problem, the concept of generalized reciprocity, formally defined as the rule
of “help anyone if helped by someone”, has been developed [19]. This concept, whose roots lie
within “upstream reciprocity” [20, 21] has been fully explored in Refs. [17, 18]. The intrinsic
feature that may favor generalized reciprocity over others is that the proximate mechanism
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FIG. 1: The concept of generalized reciprocity explained by the (random) interactions within a
group of 5 individuals. Solid directed lines are active relationships, whereas dashed are inactive in
the respective round. In each round the individuals are colored according to their willingness for
cooperation described by the internal state. As shown, in round t = 1 individual I exchanges
cooperative experiences with 1, 2 and 3. This results in changes in the internal states of the
interacting individuals and the level of cooperation that is provided when tasked in t = 2.
behind it may be explained by the changes of an individuals’ physiological condition [22–24].
In other words, the decision of an individual whether to cooperate or not, is based on an
internal cooperative state which captures its past experience. To shed light on the dynamical
process behind state-based generalized reciprocity, we provide an intuitive illustration in
Fig. 1.
This simple behavioral mechanism may apply to a wide range of dynamical interaction
structures. Specifically, the internal state may mimic aggregated fitness in biological sys-
tems, wealth or well-being in animal and human societies, or energy level in artificial (e.g.
communication) systems. These observations are complemented with convincing empiri-
cal evidence suggesting the possibility that such a mechanism may have indeed emerged in
natural systems by evolution [22, 23, 25–27].
Nevertheless, the development of theoretical models has been lacking and so far only
pairwise linear interactions between individuals [28, 29] have been considered. Other ubiq-
uitous scenarios that describe a social dilemma as group interactions [30], the possibility of
nonlinear payoffs [11, 12] or even intertwined combinations of them [31], have been eschewed.
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A. Our contribution
Motivated by the early exploits of Motro [32] on public goods, and the insights provided
in [14, 15, 33], here we revisit the concept of social dilemmas within a society that follows
a state-based behavioral mechanism in the spirit of [29]. We implement this framework to
examine the applicability of the behavioral mechanism in a wide class of payoff structures,
and thus study the general setup that is required for state-based generalized reciprocity
to promote cooperation. Under this rather general model, the well-studied problems of
prisoner’s dilemma [34], public goods game [30] and the common-pool resource problem [35]
arise as special cases (see Appendix A for simple examples). Moreover, the model can
easily accommodate different combinations of interaction structures and/or payoff functions
and capture their dynamics. Even though such structures have been widespread in natural
systems [12], the role of generalized reciprocity in their cooperation dynamics is yet to be
explored.
By treating the problem from the perspective of dynamical systems, here we develop a
systematic way to investigate the implications created by these structures. Our model reveals
that, under some simple assumptions, cooperation through generalized reciprocity emerges
as the unique attractor that maximizes the global level of cooperation while at the same
time preventing each participating individual from being exploited by the environment. The
analysis elucidates the role of the interaction topology, here described via a complex network,
which covers the standardly studied “mixed population” and “regular lattice” models as
special cases. It turns out that here a critical role plays a specific network centrality measure
which quantifies the propensity of the network structure to cooperation, by dictating the
degree of cooperation displayed both at microscopic and macroscopic level.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II we introduce the interaction struc-
ture, the state-based social dilemma and the behavioral update rule. In Sec. III we provide
an analytical study of the asymptotic behavior of the cooperation dynamics in a popula-
tion consisting of both individuals that follow a state-based update rule and unconditional
defectors. We examine two phase transitions, extinction of cooperation and unconditional
cooperation, which show to critically capture the properties of the behavioral mechanism
based on generalized reciprocity. In Sec. IV we address in detail a practical example by con-
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sidering an interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game
played on random graphs. The last section summarizes our findings. Further examples of
social dilemmas with some additional analysis and theoretical background are provided in
Appendices A-C.
II. MODEL
A. Interaction structure
We consider a class of dynamical models constituted of a finite population N of N indi-
viduals. The models run in discrete time and explain the evolution of the N dimensional
vector p(t) ∈ [0,1]N , where the i-th entry, pi(t), describes the internal state of individual
i in round t. According to our representation the individual payoff generated in each time
step, is a function of the population state vector,
yi,G (t) = bi,G (p(t)) − ci,G (pi(t)) , (1)
where bi,G and ci,G are respectively the benefit and cost function of individual i, both
parametrized by a connected graph G (N ,E). The graph is defined by a set of vertices N ,
corresponding to the set of individuals, and E ⊆ N ×N is the set of edges which determines
the pairwise relationships between individuals.
The generality of the model is captured by the freedom in the choice of the benefit function
bi,G and the cost function ci,G . The only constraint that we thereby make is that we restrict
both functions to be sufficiently smooth and adhere to several simple assumptions that define
a social dilemma. In particular, we assume that the benefit function is non-decreasing with
respect to each coordinate-wise projection that is not i, with the note that it is strictly
increasing for some projections that are defined through the network topology and the rules
of interaction. This implies that i gains with the increase in the willingness for cooperation
of a particular group of other individuals. We name this group the l-neighborhood of i and
represent it as N (l)i . Moreover, we restrict the cost function to be an increasing function of
pi(t) in order to capture the social setting of paying a higher cost for the increments in the
benefits of others. Finally, both functions should satisfy bi,G (0) = ci,G (0) = 0 so as indicating
that nothing happens when everyone defects unconditionally.
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In one possible physical interpretation, the model (1) describes the payoff of a continuous
game with deterministic (i.e fixed) interactions between the individuals at each time step
and where each individual has a continuum of behavioral strategies to choose from. This
is, for example, the case with the continuous iterative prisoner’s dilemma. In another in-
terpretation, (1) provides a deterministic approximation for the steady state of stochastic
interactions among the individuals, with random payoffs generated by the individual internal
states. In this context, bi,G and ci,G are affine maps with respect to the random variables.
The second interpretation, that we will closely follow, is aligned to the concept of generalized
reciprocity, in the sense that it describes the individual payoffs as a function of the benefit
they obtain through random interactions with individuals from their neighborhood, without
explicit records to the contributions during these interactions.
B. The social dilemma
The definitions of the benefit and cost functions offer a realistic representation for a
plethora of real-life situations. However, they alone do not describe the social dilemma. To
set the stage for this phenomena, we must define two additional conditions that have to be
present within the payoff structure.
First, for every individual there should exist a point beyond which cooperation is costly,
i.e. beyond this point the individual is better-off by not increasing the willingness to coop-
erate, while expecting cooperation from others. This implies that, full cooperation by all
individuals does not belong to the set of Nash equilibria, defined as the set of points that
maximize the individuals’ payoff given the set of available actions of all other individuals.
Formally, we define this condition as the point p ∈ [0,1]N , such that for every other point
pˆ satisfying projj (pˆ) ≥ projj (p) for all j ∈ N (l)i , where projj (pˆ) is the j-th coordinate-wise
projection of pˆ , the rate at which the benefit of individual i changes is lower than the change
in the cost when only its internal state is slightly perturbed while everything else is kept
constant. In other words, for all those pˆ,
∂bi,G(pˆ)
∂pi
<
dci,G(pˆi)
dpi
. (2)
Second, for all pˆ ∈ [0,1]N , the sum over the changes in benefits of all j ∈ N must be
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greater than or equal to the change in cost provided by i,
∑
j
∂bj,G(pˆ)
∂pi
≥
dci,G(pˆi)
dpi
, (3)
with the strict inequality holding when pˆ = 0.
Condition (3) together with the definitions of the benefit and cost functions, bi,G and ci,G ,
reveals that full cooperation by all individuals, pi(t) = 1, for all i and t, is an efficient solution,
i.e. it is a solution that maximizes the overall population payoff. Considered together these
two conditions build a structure under which egoistic behavior leads to depletion of the
performance of the overall system, which is exactly the social dilemma metaphor.
A typical example for an interaction mechanism that is easily captured by this represen-
tation is the snowdrift game, where cooperation is a favorable trait for an individual as long
as the number of cooperative neighbors is low [36]. Another group of mechanisms that are
modeled when condition (2) holds for all pˆ ∈ [0,1]N and condition (3) is a strict inequality
for every pˆ are the prisoner’s dilemma [36], the common pool resource problem [35], the
public goods game [30], as well as extensions and combinations of these three interactions
structures that constrain the cost of an individual to be a function only of its own state are
covered (see for example [14, 15, 31, 32, 37–39]). In Appendix A we provide a short overview
for state-based social dilemmas that can be described through the first three interaction
structures, while a comprehensive example for the public goods game will be analyzed in
Sec. IV.
C. Behavioral update mechanism
In our scenario, the individuals follow the state-based behavioral update introduced
in [29], apart for a fraction of the population (a set D) of unconditional defectors (with
pi(t) = 0, i ∈ D, for all t).
The behavioral update rule describes the cooperative state of individual i at time t+1 as
a function of its’ accumulated payoff Yi,G(t) by time t
pi(t + 1) = fi (Yi,G(t)) , (4)
where Yi,G(t) = Yi,G(t − 1) + yi,G(t), with Yi,G(0) being the initial condition and yi,G(0) = 0.
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We assume that the function fi ∶ R → (0,1), which maps the payoff Y to the willingness
for cooperation pi, is continuous on the interval (0,1) and has a continuous inverse (i.e. is a
homeomorphism). Additionally, it is monotonically increasing with limY→−∞ fi(Y) = 0 and
limY→∞ fi(Y) = 1.
An example of a function with the above properties (which, for example, is often used for
modeling in biology and ecology) is the logistic function fi(Y) = [1 + e−κi(Y−ωi)]−1, where the
parameters κi and ωi define the steepness, respectively the midpoint of the function.
This rule provides a simple description for the cooperative behavior in a wide range
of dynamical interaction structures. Specifically, the internal state may mimic aggregated
fitness in biological systems, wealth or well-being in animal and human societies, or energy
level in artificial systems [29]. Its advantage lies in its simplicity since (4) can easily be
described as a Markovian process where an individual only has to know its present state
and payoff in order to determine the next action. This is significantly different from other
reciprocal update rules. For instance, in certain interaction structures direct reciprocity
requires extensive memory requirements to record own and opponents’ actions in order for
cooperation to thrive [40].
III. RESULTS
A. Cooperation dynamics
We begin the analysis by studying the properties of the steady state solution p∗. We will
thereby assume that the interaction structure is non-degenerate, which, in our terms, means
that the Jacobian of the individual payoff functions accounting only for the individuals that
follow the generalized reciprocity update rule, Jy
∖D(p), at the point 0 is nonsingular. In
fact, it is easy to notice that as a consequence of (3), this assumption always holds when the
whole population follows (4).
Now, in steady state, for the individuals adhering to (4), i.e. the non-defectors, it holds
p∗i = fi (f−1i (p∗i ) + bi,G (p∗) − ci,G(p∗i )) . (5)
By applying the inverse map, we obtain
f−1i (p∗i ) = f−1i (p∗i ) + bi,G (p∗) − ci,G (p∗i ) . (6)
8
For the above equation to hold, it is required that 1) y∗i,G ≐ bi,G (p∗) − ci,G (p∗i ) = 0, unless
either 2) p∗i = 1 (i.e. Y
∗
i,G = ∞), or 3) p
∗
i = 0 (i.e.Y
∗
i,G = −∞).
It is easy to verify that condition 3) is a special case of condition 1) when p∗j = 0 for all
j ∈ N (l)i . Indeed, when p∗i = 0, it must be that y∗i,G ≤ 0. By the definition of (4), the condition
y∗i,G < 0 implies p
∗
i = 0 which, on the other hand implies y
∗
i,G ≥ 0, leading to a contradiction.
Therefore, whenever p∗i = 0 it must hold that y
∗
i,G = 0, which is true if and only if p
∗
j = 0 for
all j ∈ N (l)i .
These conditions, together with the (strict) monotonicity of the function fi and the as-
sumption that the interactions are non-degenerate, reveal that each individual i conforming
to (4) will increase, respectively decrease, its willingness for cooperation (based on its envi-
ronment, i.e. on the state dynamics of other individuals), until the system reaches a steady
state where it is either satisfied y∗i,G = 0 or p
∗
i = 1, for all i /∈ D. In other words, each individ-
ual following the generalized reciprocity rule will cooperate with the maximal willingness,
given its environment, so as it is not exploited. In this context, the steady state p∗ may be
interpreted as a solution of the constrained optimization problem of maximizing the global
level of cooperation, subject to all individuals that follow the rule receiving a non-negative
payoff while the unconditional defectors have p∗i = 0,
p∗ = arg max
p ∈ [0,1]N
{∑
i/∈D
pi; yi,G (p) ≥ 0 ∀i and pi = 0 ∀i ∈ D} . (7)
In Appendix B we provide further reasoning behind this representation. Moreover, there we
also discuss that the solution to equation (7) is unique, i.e. the corresponding dynamical
system has a unique attractor. This implies that local cooperative behavior diffuses as a flux
of energy over the network, eventually saturating at a point where cooperation is maximized
under the constraint that no single individual is exploited.
B. Phase transitions
Next, we turn our attention to the phase transitions of the system. There are two such
points which are of particular interest to us. The first transition corresponds to the situation
when the behavioral rule (4) is not able to support cooperation, i.e. below this point the
steady state solution is described by p∗ = 0. The contrapositive of this condition represents
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a weak requirement for cooperation, in the sense that it represents a necessary condition for
individuals with positive willingness for cooperation to exist.
The second transition point that we investigate quantifies a stronger condition for co-
operation, corresponding to the situation where above this point all individuals (aside the
unconditional defectors) are unconditional cooperators, i.e. the steady-state solution reads
p∗i = 1 for all i /∈ D.
We study both transitions by using a differential equation representation of the update
rule (see Appendix C for more details regarding the conditions under which the representation
is valid)
p˙i =
dfi (f−1i (pi))
dY
[bi,G (p) − ci,G (pi)] . (8)
In the following we provide a description of the conditions that are required for extinction and
full unconditional cooperation to happen. The detailed proofs are provided in Appendix C.
In particular, by analyzing the asymptotic stability of the system at the fixed point p∗ = 0
we show that the sufficient condition for extinction of cooperation can be approximated as
λmax (J∖Dy (0)) < 0. (9)
where λmax(J∖Dy (p)) is the largest eigenvalue of J∖Dy (p).
In fact, a similar result can be reached by studying the optimization problem (7). Alto-
gether, this indicates that when every eigenvalue of the reduced Jacobian J∖Dy (0) is negative,
the system becomes dissipative and there is a continuous shrinkage in the displayed level of
cooperation.
Similarly, by examining the stability of the linearized system at the point 1∖D (the N
dimensional vector with entries 1 for all i /∈ D and 0 otherwise), we get that unconditional
cooperation is asymptotically stable if
min
i/∈D
(v∖Di,G ) > 1, (10)
where v∖Di,G is
v∖Di,G =
bi,G(1∖D)
ci,G(1) . (11)
We note that the strict inequality in the approximation of the condition might be relaxed,
as suggested by the sufficient and necessary conditions for unconditional cooperation. Indeed,
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on the one hand, from the properties of the update rule we have that v∖Di,G > 1 for all i /∈ D
implies y∗i,G > 0, and hence p
∗
i = 1 for all i /∈ D. On the other hand, in the necessary part
the weak inequality v∖Di,G ≥ 1 holds, which follows by directly substituting p
∗
i = 1 in (1) and
repeating the same argument for all i /∈ D. This further implies that individuals for which the
inequality is not satisfied will never cooperate unconditionally. In this sense, the quantity
v∖Di,G arises as an index that quantifies the burden of each individual when cooperating, thus
ultimately determining the degree of cooperation both at microscopic and macroscopic level.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Public goods example
As a constructive example for the applicative power of our framework, we consider an
interaction mechanism which couples the iterated public goods game with a simple donation
activity.
In particular, we assume that in each time step nature randomly conditions whether the
state of the global system is in provision of public goods or in donation. When in public
goods state, each individual i acts as a factor in di processes of production represented by
its nearest neighbors N 1i , with di = ∣N 1i ∣ being the degree of the individual. Its input in each
round t is proportional to the internal cooperative state pi(t), whereas its productivity is
inversely related with the degree di, thus leading to equal aggregate productivity of each
individual.
For concreteness, we consider a linear production function,
qj(t) = α∑
k
Akj
dk
pk,
where α is a parameter that describes the efficiency among the producers and Akj ∈ {0,1}
is the (k, j)-th entry of the adjacency matrix A of the graph. In order to follow standard
practice, we always fix Aii = 1, thus each individual has one production process represented
by its own vertex. To make the provision of public good related with generalized reciprocity
we assume that after production takes place, qj(t) is distributed to a randomly (on uniform)
chosen individual from the nearest neighbors of j.
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On the other hand, when the system is in a donation state, each individual i chooses a
nearest neighbor at random and decides whether to donate him an amount α with probability
proportional to its internal state pi(t).
The resulting public goods interaction is a randomized version of the model introduced
in [41], which has been extensively studied from the perspective of network reciprocity (a
comprehensive review is provided in [42]). In addition, when combined with the donation
activity, it resembles the famous “carrot” mechanism in a generalized reciprocity system [31].
One round of this interaction structure is depicted in Fig. 2.
B. Properties
In this structure, the random payoff of individual i in round t is defined as
yi(t) = e(t)y1i(t) + (1 − e(t))y2i(t),
where e(t) is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter ε that describes the global state,
and,
y1i(t) =∑
j
m1ji(t)qj(t) − pi(t),
y2i(t) = α∑
j≠i
m2ji(t)xj(t) − xi(t),
(12)
are the payoffs of the public goods game and the donation process. In equation (12),
m1ji(t), m2ji(t) and xj(t) are, respectively, Bernoulli random variables with parameters
Aji/dj, Aji/(dj − 1) and pj(t).
In this example, the benefit and cost functions represent affine maps with respect to the
random variables. Therefore, we can approximate the analysis of the steady state with the
following deterministic payoff
yi(t) = εα∑
j
Aji
dj
∑
k
Akj
dk
pk(t) + (1 − ε)α∑
k≠i
Aki
dk − 1
pk(t) − pi(t). (13)
From (13) one can easily deduce that for each particular individual i, conditions (2) and
(3) are satisfied whenever α ∈ (1, di
zi
1
ε
), where zi = ∑j Aji/dj is a centrality measure which
quantifies the expected number of times that individual i is selected to be at the receiving
end of a production process or a donation. The effect of the distribution of zi (also referred
12
FIG. 2: Scheme for the studied example. Top row shows one round of interactions for two
production processes I and J in the network example that we examine. Solid directed edges
indicate the contributions by individuals i ∈ {1,2,3,4}, whereas the bended dashed edges are the
randomly distributed outputs qj, with j ∈ {I, J}. The bottom row describes the donation activity
for the same individuals.
to as neighborhood importance index) on the network propensity for cooperation has been
discussed in [29].
A refined version of this index, which is proportional to the maximal average benefit of
individual i, can be defined as
s∖Di = ε∑
j
Aji
dj
∑
k/∈D
Akj
dk
+ (1 − ε) ∑
k/∈D∪i
Aki
dk − 1
. (14)
Its relation with the efficiency parameter α directly determines the level of cooperation of
the system because the cooperation index v∖Di,G can be written as
v∖Di,G = αs
∖D
i .
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This implies that full cooperation will exist whenever
α >
1
s∖Dmin
, (15)
where s∖Dmin is the minimum among the s
∖D indices.
Finally, the matrix J∖Dy (0) whose largest eigenvalue determines whether cooperation will
die out or not is
J∖Dy (0) = α [εM∖D1 + (1 − ε)M∖D2 ] − I,
where the (i, j)-th entries ofM∖D1 andM∖D2 areM∖D1ij = ∑k Akidk Ajkdj andM∖D2ij = Ajidj−1 (M∖D2ii = 0),
and I is the identity matrix.
This implies that the condition for extinction of cooperation reads
α <
1
λmax (εM∖D1 + (1 − ε)M∖D2 ) . (16)
In the special case when every individual follows the update (4), M∖D1 and M
∖D
2 repre-
sent left stochastic matrices, in which case λmax (εM∖D1 + (1 − ε)M∖D2 ) = 1. Since α > 1 is
prerequisite for a social dilemma, this condition will never hold in a population consisting
exclusively of individuals that follow the state-based rule (i.e. without defectors).
C. Implications
We test these analytical findings on three different types of random graph models, the
Random Regular (RR) graph, the Erdos-Renyi (ER) random graph and the Barabasi-Albert
(BA) scale-free network.
Throughout the analysis, as a measure for the global level of cooperation we consider the
fraction of unconditional cooperators ⟨p∗⟩ out of the individuals that follow the state-based
update rule. In the top row of Fig. 3 we study the evolution of this variable as a function
of the efficiency parameter α when D = ∅ and by considering three cases of ε. Namely, we
examine the situations when there is only a donation process (ε = 0), when there is equal
probability for happening of both processes (ε = 0.5) and when only public goods are present
in the system (ε = 1).
14
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FIG. 3: Results for the public goods example. Top row shows the fraction of unconditional
cooperators ⟨p∗⟩ as a function of α, while the bottom row gives the estimated probability density
function of the index s. The columns correspond to different values of the parameter ǫ. The
results are averaged over 100 realizations with each graph having N = 100 and average degree 5.
The condition for extinction of cooperation is plotted in the figure as a square point. As
suggested by the analytical findings, cooperation in each graph and interaction structure
exists as long as α satisfies the condition for a social dilemma.
However, the dependency of ⟨p∗⟩ on α is generally disparate across the three interaction
structures we explore, with the only similarity arising in the RR graph. In that case, it can
be seen that full unconditional cooperation happens always independently of the interaction
structure. For the ER and BA graphs, we discover that in each interaction structure the
former graph acts as a better promoter of cooperation for low values of α. While this
persists when donation is the sole mechanism, whenever provisioning of public goods enters
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the system, a critical point appears beyond which the BA graph performs better in terms of
the number of unconditional cooperators (see the inset plots).
To interpret these observations, in the bottom row of Fig. 3 we display the probability
density function of the index s∖D, when there are no defectors (here simply denoted as s).
The figure shows that the distribution of this variable in the RR graph resembles a Dirac
delta function with the mass centered on 1. This implies that the condition for asymptotic
stability of unconditional cooperation is satisfied for every plausible α, which in turn implies
the full unconditional cooperation observed at α = 1. For the ER and BA random graphs
we notice that the distribution of s is positively skewed with the BA graph exhibiting by
far larger skewness. A direct consequence of this is the remark for the evolution of ⟨p∗⟩ in
the two graphs. More precisely, the right tail of the distribution determines the degree of
cooperation provided when the level of efficiency is low. In this regard the lower slope in the
ER graph indicates that for low α, there will be more individuals for which the necessary
condition for unconditional cooperation is satisfied.
Similarly, the left tail explains why the BA graph converges to full unconditional cooper-
ation faster than the ER graph in the case of public goods. In particular, as ε increases the
kurtosis in the distribution of s also increases for both ER and BA graphs, implying that
the individuals tend to become more similar in regard to this index. The increment is larger
for the BA graph, and therefore the lower thresholds for unconditional cooperation in the
case of public goods.
In order to quantify the effect of defectors, in Fig. 4 we display contour plots for the
fraction of unconditional cooperators as a function of both the efficiency parameter and the
fraction of individuals that are unconditional defectors for each of the studied random graphs.
In the figure, above the green (light gray) lines is the region where cooperation ceases to
exist, whereas below the red (dark gray) lines is the region where all individuals outside the
defector set cooperate unconditionally. In the region in-between, unconditional cooperators
coexist with partial cooperators (those with 0 < p∗i < 1) and unconditional defectors. As
defectors we always set the D individuals with the highest values of d/z. This is the group
of individuals for which the social dilemma requires a larger α as a means to disappear, if
there is a positive probability for reaching a public goods state.
We find that, among the random graph models, the ER graph model requires the lowest
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FIG. 4: Contour plots for the transition points. The green (light gray) curves are contour plots
for the transition points to extinction of cooperation while the red (dark gray) curves are the
transition points to full unconditional cooperation, with the dashed lines indicating the estimated
thresholds from equations (9) and (10). With the black vertical line we denote the minimum of
d/z. The rows represent different types of random graphs (RR, ER and BA) while the columns
correspond to different values of ǫ. The results are averaged across 100 graph realizations
consisting of 100 individuals with each graph having an average degree of 5.
efficiency (benefit to cost ratio) for the cooperation to persist (i.e. not to be extinct),
followed by the RR graph. The BA graph presents itself as the topology where extinction
of cooperation is more probable (compared with ER and RR graphs), for the same average
graph degree. We remark that this observation is independent on the choice for ε. In contrast,
it can be noticed that there is quite a colorful discrepancy with respect to the threshold above
which full (i.e. unconditional) cooperation begins. In this aspect, when donation is the only
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natural process, the RR graph is the most supportive to cooperation, followed by the ER
and the BA graph. However, when public goods is included in the possible natural states,
it seems that when around half of the population is constituted by defectors the BA graph
performs better in promoting unconditional cooperation, while the ER graph is the best
promoter of unconditional cooperation when the majority of the population are defectors.
Similarly to the scenario without defectors, in the case with defectors the findings can
also be attributed to the distribution of the index s. Concretely, the inclusion of defectors
can be described as an internal force which ultimately decreases the value of s. From this
point of view, the extinction of cooperation is related to the right tail of the distribution
since then one faces instances where the necessary condition for existence of cooperation is
not fulfilled. As discussed previously, the ER graph has the largest tail for the distribution
of the index s among the studied random graphs, and therefore is most robust to extinction
of cooperation when defectors are included. On the other hand, it seems considerably more
delicate to precisely quantify the differences between the random graph models with respect
to the existence of full unconditional cooperation as function of the distribution of the index
s, as the results depend on the specific choice of the individuals which are selected as defec-
tors. Nonetheless, one can notice that, as the number of defectors increases the distribution
of s is driven towards lower values and thus the threshold for full cooperation increases.
Evidently this has lowest effect on the RR graph since the distribution of s in that case
concentrates around one value, i.e. there are no tails. Hence the observed lower thresholds
for full unconditional cooperation in the sole donation case. We note that, in general, this
explanation does not hold when provision of public goods is a possible state in the global
system since then, as shown previously, for each individual a critical point exists after which
cooperation is no longer a social dilemma. For instance, the value of this critical point in
the RR graph is independent of the selected individual (its minimum for each graph and
structure in the figure is denoted as a black vertical line). From the figure, it appears that
the ER graph requires the lowest efficiency in order to have a nonempty set of individuals
for which the social dilemma disappears, followed by the BA graph. A direct corollary of
this is the observed lower threshold for full unconditional cooperation in these two graphs,
compared to the RR graph, when a large fraction of the population behaves as defectors.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we developed a unifying framework for studying the role of a state-based
behavioral mechanism centered on generalized reciprocity, on the cooperation dynamics in
complex networks. Such mechanisms have been recently discovered in natural systems which
involve low-level interactions among network agents with limited processing/cognitive abil-
ities. Interestingly, they have also been attested at the more intelligent level of human
interactions [23, 27].
While there is significant empirical evidence for the presence of these mechanisms in a
plethora of real-life systems, the role of the network structure on the cooperation dynamics
under general interaction models has only recently start to shape the research in various
fields. In this context, we believe that the here introduced framework provides a systematic
way to study the various aspects of cooperation in complex networks. In particular, the
generality of the addressed framework allows for incorporation of a wide range of social
dilemmas and interaction structures in the model.
Besides its theoretical value, we believe that the framework may also be used to quantify
the cooperation dynamics in real-life systems governed by similar behavioral mechanisms.
We refer to a recent experimental study which suggests that the pay-it-forward principle of
generalized reciprocity is a better promoter of long-term cooperation among humans than
indirect reciprocity simply because it is cognitively less demanding [43]. In this context,
our (and similar) models may provide the theoretical background for the observed long-term
behavior. Indeed, the above observation may be addressed from the dynamical systems
perspective, under which the application of a behavioral mechanism based on generalized
reciprocity yields a unique attractor where the overall level of cooperation is maximized,
while at the same time the involved individuals are prevented from exploitation.
As a final remark, we point out that the presented framework may apply beyond the
studied structures and can easily be coupled with other mutual processes found in social
and natural systems [44, 45]. As such it acts as a building block for investigating the role of
state-based generalized reciprocity in the dynamics of intertwining phenomena of different
nature. This represents an interesting direction for future work.
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Appendix A: Social dilemma examples
The Prisoner’s Dilemma: This is the most famous example for a social dilemma where
the interactions are pairwise. In the simplest case, in a prisoner’s dilemma a cooperator pays
a cost γ for the other individual to receive a benefit β [34]. In the original case, β > γ is a
prerequisite in order for a social dilemma to exist. When extended to a network structure,
each individual meets with its nearest neighbors N 1i and experiences the same interactions.
Therefore, the payoff of individual i in a prisoner’s dilemma played on a network where the
strategies are formed by a state-based update can be written as
yi(t) = β∑
j
Aijpj(t) − γdipi(t). (A1)
To exist a dilemma, equation (2) needs to hold for all pˆ and equation (2) has to be a strict
inequality for all pˆ. It is obvious that this will happen if β > γ, as in the original interaction
structure.
The prisoner’s dilemma can be easily extended to account for random interactions, and
thus to resemble more closely interactions where generalized reciprocity can happen. For
example, this is done in references [28, 29].
Snowdrift Game: The snowdrift game is the simplest form of a nonlinear interaction
structure where cooperation by an individual is an advantageous strategy whenever the state
of the neighboring individuals is defective.
The payoff in a pairwise snowdrift game defined on a network, can be written in a similar
way as in the prisoner’s dilemma. In particular, the payoff of individual i in round t is
yi(t) =∑
j
Aij [βpj(t) + βpi(t) + pi(t)(γ
2
− β)pj(t)] − γdipi(t). (A2)
In this interaction structure, condition (2) implies that cooperation by i will be a favorable
threat as long as the average level of cooperation by the neighbors satisfies the following
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inequality
∑
j
Aij
di
pj <
β − γ
β − γ/2 .
On the other hand, condition (3) will be satisfied whenever β > γ/2.
Interestingly, one may find out that, by applying the rules for extinction and full coop-
eration that we described, a state-based generalized reciprocity update rule always leads to
full cooperation by the individuals that follow it as long as β > γ. This result is independent
of the structure of unconditional defectors.
Common-pool Resource problem: Common-pool resource problem is a situation
that best depicts the “tragedy of the commons” [46]. Formally, a tragedy of commons is
a situation where there is shared renewable resource that will continue to produce benefits
if the population does not over harvest it but in which any single individual profits from
harvesting as much as possible [47].
As a typical example for this situation we consider a model where a mixed population
(represented by a fully connected network) at each round t are harvesting a resource R(t)
with an amount that is inversely proportional to their internal state. The payoff of each
individual i is given as
yi(t) = (1 − δpi(t))(R(t) − 1) − γpi(t), (A3)
where δ is a parameter which regulates the optimal consumption by the group (optimally
each individual would consume (1−δ) fraction of the resource, and γ is the opportunity cost.
Different dynamics can be used for the evolution of R(t + 1). For simplicity we assume
that in each round the resource grows by one unit and depletes by the average amount of
the consumption by all individuals (for other representations see [48]). Mathematically, this
is written as
R(t + 1) = R(t) + 1 − R
N
∑
j
(1 − δpj(t)) . (A4)
To estimate p∗, one first needs to estimate the equilibrium resource R∗ from equation (A4)
and substitute the result in equation (A3).
Then, the conditions (2) and (3) for social dilemma are given as 0 < γ < δ < 1 and δ < γN .
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Appendix B: Steady state analysis
In the main text, we pointed out two assumptions on which our analysis is built.
First, in every case we consider a fraction of individuals that behave as unconditional
defectors, i.e. pi(t) = 0 for all t. This indicates that we can reduce the examination
of the model to the properties of the payoff functions of each i /∈ D defined on the set
PND = {pD ∈ [0,1]N ∶ ∀i ∈ D, proji(pD) = 0}. Moreover, we assumed that the interaction
structure is non-degenerate, i.e. Jy
∖D(0), where Jy∖Dij (0) = ∂yi,G(0)∂pj for all i, j /∈ D, is a non-
singular matrix. As we will see, the second assumption ensures that the system will never be
stuck in a saddle point. Against this background, we can derive the described proposition
for the steady state solution.
Proposition B1 – Steady State Solution: If a fraction of the individuals base their state
update pi(t) on the rule
pi(t + 1) = fi (Yi,G(t)) ,
where Yi,G(t) = Yi,G(t − 1) + yi,G(t), with Yi,G(0) being the initial condition and yi,G(0) = 0,
and fi ∶ R → (0,1), is a strictly monotonic homeomorphism that satisfies limY→−∞ fi(Y) = 0
and limY→∞ fi(Y) = 1, then the stable steady state solution p∗ is unique and can be found
as the solution to the constrained optimization problem of maximizing the overall level of
cooperation such that every individual has a nonnegative payoff, i.e.,
p∗ = arg max
p ∈ PND
{∑
i/∈D
pi; yi,G (p) ≥ 0 ∀i} . (B1)
Sketch of proof: For all i /∈ D, fix Yi,G(0) to some arbitrary real number. By construction,
pi(1) ∈ (0,1). Moreover, the reduced individual payoff vector y∖D(t) that accounts for the
payoffs of all those i can be approximated as
y∖D(1) ≈ J∖Dy (0) ⋅p∖D(1),
where p∖D(1) is the corresponding state vector in t = 1.
Since J∖Dy (0) is nonsingular, there exists some i in the set of individuals that follow
the rule such that yi(1) ≠ 0. Without loss of generality, let us assume that for all those
i yi,G(1) > 0 (similar arguments hold when there exist individuals with yi,G(1) < 0). The
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strict monotonicity implies that these individuals will increase their cooperative state in
the following period. By iterating the same procedure for a finite amount of times we can
easily deduce that similar dynamics will appear in every period t (the set of individuals with
positive payoffs may change). In the limit as t→∞, the individuals with positive payoffs will
be able to increase their states until p∗i = 1 or some p
∗
i that satisfies yi,G(p∗) = 0. The second
possibility is again a result of the strict monotonicity of f (a negative payoff implies that the
individual will decrease its cooperative state until the condition is reached). Therefore, in the
steady state each individual conforming to (4) will cooperate with the maximal willingness,
based on its environment, so as it is not exploited, indicating that the steady state internal
cooperative state vector p∗ can be found as a solution to (B1).
Notice that a steady state solution can still be found as a solution to (B1) even if Jy(0).
However, then due to the singularity of Jy(0) multiple steady states may appear that behave
as saddle points.
Now let us turn to the uniqueness part. It is known that a constrained optimization
problem will have a unique maximum if the objective function (in this case ∑i pi ) is strictly
quasiconcave and all constraints are quasiconcave (yi(p)). Formally, a continuously differ-
entiable function f is quasiconcave in a convex set X , if for any two points x1 and x2 in the
set such that f(x1) ≥ f(x2) we have that
Jf (x2) (x1 − x2) ≥ 0, (B2)
where Jf (⋅) is the Jacobian of the function f, with the strict inequality whenever imply-
ing that the function is strictly quasiconcave. Further information about the properties of
(strictly) quasiconcave functions and their role in constrained optimization can be found in
[49].
For simpler notation, let pΣ(p) ≐ ∑i/∈D pi. Since pΣ(p) is linear with respect to each
projection, it is easy to show that for every p1 and p2 such that pΣ(p1) > pΣ(p2), the strict
inequality in (B2) will hold. In addition, by Taylor expanding yi(p) for all i, at a point p2
it follows that the constraints are quasiconcave for all p1 such that yi(p1) ≥ yi(p2). ∎
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Appendix C: Phase transition analysis
The analysis for the phase transitions of the system relies heavily on the differential
equation form (8). Therefore, before we analyze them we rewrite the discrete system in the
continuous form presented in the main text. Concretely, the update rule can be described
with the following recurrence relation
pi(t + 1) = fi(f−1i (pi(t)) + bi,G (p(t)) − ci,G (pi(t)) ). (C1)
Note that from this representation the steady state equation (5) is derived.
By expanding equation (C1) point-wise through Taylor series at the point f−1i (pi(t)) we
can approximate pi(t + 1) as
pi(t + 1) ≈ pi(t) + dfi (f−1i (pi(t)))
dY
[bi,G (p(t)) − ci,G (pi(t))] ,
which can be written in the differential form given in equation (8), i.e.,
p˙i =
dfi (f−1i (pi))
dY
[bi,G (p) − ci,G (pi)] ,
for all i /∈ D.
Moreover, as can be seen from equation (8) the study of the system is dependent on the
properties of the (higher order) derivatives of fi. Since we do not have a specific form for the
update rule, they may be difficult to attain. Nevertheless, we can use a simple trick based
on the smoothness of the update rule to discover the properties. In particular, notice that
the famous Logistic function, defined as
g(Y) = [1 + e−κ(Y−ω)]−1 ,
where the parameters κ and ω define the steepness, respectively the midpoint of the function,
is a specific function that satisfies our definition for being a generalized reciprocity update
rule. More importantly, this function has well-defined derivatives. For example the first
derivative is
dg(Yˆ)
dY
= g(Yˆ) (1 − g(Yˆ)) and the second is d2g(Yˆ)
dY2
= g(Yˆ) (1 − g(Yˆ)) (1 − 2g(Yˆ)).
Hence, we can define a continuously differentiable and monotonically increasing function
hi ∶ R → R that acts as a monotonic transformation of the accumulated payoff and which
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FIG. C1: An example for monotonic transformation of f . Here, the accumulated payoffs Yj for
j ∈ {1,2} are mapped to h(Yj) so as g (h(Yj)) = f(Yj).
satisfies
fi(Y) = g(hi(Y)). (C2)
Besides this, the function hi also satisfies limpi→1 hi(f−1i (pi)) = f−1i (pi) and limpi→0 hi(f−1i (pi)) =
f−1i (pi). An illustrative example for this transformation is given in Fig. C1. Now, studying
the derivatives of fi is a simpler task since we can implement the chain rule and use the
properties of the derivatives of the Logistic function.
Proposition C2 – Extinction of cooperation: If
λmax(J∖Dy (0)) < 0, (C3)
where λmax(J∖Dy (0)) is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix J∖Dy (0) with entries defined as
Jyij(0) = ∂yi(0)∂pj for all i, j /∈ D, then p∗ = 0 is an asymptotically stable steady state.
Proof: To prove this proposition we implement Lyapunov’s direct method for stability.
First, we define the function L(p) = ∑i/∈D pi. It is clear that this function is a candidate for
being a Lyapunov function since L(0) = 0 and L(pˆ) > 0 for all pˆ ≠ 0.
The time derivative of L(p) is
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L˙(p) = ∑
i/∈D
pi (1 − pi) dhi (f−1i (pi))
dY
[bi,G (p) − ci,G (pi)] , (C4)
which in a neighborhood around p = 0 can be approximated as
L˙(p) ≈ ∑
i/∈D
pi
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∑j/∈D
∂bi,G(0)
∂pj
pj −
dci,G(0)
dpi
pi
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, (C5)
= p∖DTJ∖Dy (0)p∖D, (C6)
where T is the transpose operator. For the system to be asymptotically stable at p∗ = 0,
expression (C6) has to be negative for all p ≠ 0. Clearly, (C6) is a quadratic form, therefore
this will happen only if J∖Dy (0) is negative definite, i.e. if λmax(J∖Dy (0)) < 0. ∎
Proposition C3 – Unconditional cooperation: Unconditional cooperation, defined as
p∗ = 1∖D, where 1∖D is an N × 1 dimensional vector with entries 1 for all i /∈ D and 0
otherwise, is an asymptotically stable steady state if
min
i/∈D
(v∖Di,G ) > 1,
where v∖Di,G =
bi,G(1∖D)
ci,G(1)
.
Proof: To analyze the asymptotic stability of the N −D dimensional system of differential
equations (8) at the point p∗ = 1∖D we apply the Hartman-Grobman theorem and study
the corresponding linear system [50]. The linearization asserts that a steady state of the
system of differential equations will be locally asymptotically stable when all eigenvalues
of its Jacobian J∖D(p∗) have negative real parts. To find when this is satisfied, we define
J∖Di (p) = p˙i. Then, the ij-th entry of J∖D(pˆ), where i, j /∈ D, at an arbitrary point pˆ of this
system can be calculated as
J∖Dij =
∂Ji
∂pj
(pˆ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d2fi(f−1i (pˆi))
dY 2
dfi(f−1i (pˆi))
dY
[bi,G (pˆ) − ci,G (pˆi)] + d(f−1i fi(pˆi))dY [∂bi,G(pˆ)∂pi + dci,G(pˆi)dpi )] , if i = j,
dfi(f−1i (pˆi))
dY
∂bi,G(pˆ)
∂pj
, otherwise.
Let p∗ → 1∖D. Since the update rule fi is monotonically increasing with limY→∞ fi(Y) = 1,
we have that limpi→1
dfi(f−1i (pˆi))
dY
= 0. Therefore,
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lim
p∗→1∖D
J∖Dij =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
limp∗→1∖D
d2fi(f−1i (p
∗
i
))
dY 2
dfi(f−1i (p
∗
i
))
dY
[bi,G (p∗) − ci,G (p∗i )] , if i = j,
0, otherwise.
(C7)
This expression simplifies the analysis because we are left with a diagonal matrix, and it is
known that in that case the diagonal entries correspond to the eigenvalues of the matrix.
Next, by applying the properties of fi defined with the monotonic transformation hi, i.e.
equation (C2), we find that
lim
p∗→1∖D
J∖Dii = −
dh (f−1(1))
dY
[bi,G (1∖D) − ci,G (1)] . (C8)
Since
dhi(f−1i (1))
dY
= 1, this expression will be negative if and only if bi,G(1∖D) − ci,G(1) > 0, i.e.
v∖Di,G > 1. Moreover, because for asymptotic stability (C8) needs to hold for all i /∈ D, we get
expression (10). ∎
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